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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: DWIGHT L. KING

}

No.F-39

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DWIGHT L. KING, a member of the Bar of this
Court, has petitioned for a review by this court of the
proceedings had in the above entitled matter, seeking to
have annuled and rejected the recommendation of the
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar entered
on the 4th day of February, 1957, wherein the Board
recommended to the Supreme Court, ''that an order be
entered suspending Mr. Dwight L. King from the practice of law in this state for a period of six months and
1
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until he is recommended for reinstatement by the Board
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar upon application
duly filed and submitted by said court."
The proceedings were originally initiated upon the
written complaint of one John ::\L Sherman, an attorney
licensed to practice in California. ::\1r. Sherman, under
date of August 6, 1954, wrote to the Utah State Bar
Commission stating that he wanted to file "a formal
complaint against a member of the Bar of the State of
Utah, Dwight L. King, associated with the firm of
Rawlings, Roberts, Wallace and Black of Salt Lake City.''
(R. 3) Mr. Sherman alleged:
''. . . The basis of the complaint against
Dwight L. King is clearly indicated by the Court
records and rna tters contained in the transcript
of the proceedings which show beyond any reasonable doubt that Mr. King had personal knowledge
that certain documents introduced into evidence
were prepared in his office on the morning of June
lOth, 1954. Mr. King, through his client, Harold
J. Schnitzer, produced them, they were admitted
into evidence on that day with the testimony that
they had been prepared in Portland, Oregon more
than a year prior to June of 1~)54. This matter
was testified to by both Harold J. Schnitzer and
'Valter E. Hutchinson and at that time ~Ir. King
himself well knew that the documents were not
prt>pan'd in Portland, Oregon but were, in fact,
pr<>pared in his office and by his secretary.
The record and transcript clearly show that
l\1 r. J(ing wns in the hotel room in the Hotel Utah
orcupied hy Harold J. Schnitzer on the morning
of J uue lOt l1, 1~);"")4, lwhn'Pll the hours of 8:30 and
9 :00 o 'cloek a.m., that he left the hotel room in
rompany with :\l.r. Hutrhinson and i\lr. Schnitzer
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to return to his own law office for the purposes of
preparing the above mentioned documents.
This conduct on the part of Mr. King is a definite breach of the Code of Ethics of any bar association and the acts committed by Mr. King in
permitting perjured testimony to be given to the
Court and false information given to the Court,
together with overt and open acts on his part in
assisting with and participating in these acts are
clearly such acts that warrant appropriate disciplinary action by your Commission." (R. 4)
Following receipt of this communication, the Utah
State Bar Commission appointed a committee to investigate the matter. This committee held an informal hearing on November 4, 1954, "for the purpose of taking a
voluntary statement from Dwight L. King, who is here
in company with Wayne L. Black." (Exh. T 3, p. 1) Mr.
King, who was not represented by counsel and Mr.
Wayne L. Black, a fellow member of the Bar, made
voluntary statements before the committee which statements were stenographically reported and transcribed
and appear in the record before this Court as Exhibit

T 3.
Subsequently, on March 7, 1955, the investigating
committee through its chairman, Mark K. Boyle, made
a report to Mr. Lee M. Cummings, Secretary of the Utah
State Bar, in which the commtitee summarized its activities as follows :
''Mr. Sherman alleges generally that Mr. King
had personal knowledge of the fact that certain
documents had been prepared and executed in his
office on June 10, 1954, and that with such knowledge he caused them to be introduced into evidence
3
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purporting to be documents which had been prepared many months prior in Portland, Oregon.
"Mr. King's version is that he was aware that
some documents were being prepared in his office
on the morning of June lOth, but that he paid
little attention to the subject matter thereof and
that he was taken by surprise when his witnesses
testified that they had been prepared and executed
at a different time and place.
''The Committee feels that this explanation is
not entirely satisfactory and that .:\Ir. King's conduct during the examination of the witnesses indicates that he was not taken by surprise. However,
according to his own statement he conferred with
his witnesses during the noon recess and supposedly chastized them for misrepresenting the
facts, but he nevertheless remained silent during
the rest of the day when the misrepresentation
continued.
"It is the recommendation of the Committee
that appropriate disciplinary action be taken by
the Board of Commissioners.''
Sometime later, (the record does not disclose the
date thereof), a formal complaint, Xo. ·F-39 was filed
and a citation issued to ~r r. King directing him to appear
within 10 days after the service of the citation upon him
to defend the allegations of the complaint. (R. 8) The
complaint alleged that _Mr. l{ing was g-uilty of unprofessional conduct as follows:
"l{nowingly permitting witnesses to fabricate
P\'id0nre and testify falsely before the District
( ~onrt of Davis County., (R. 9)
The citation was served upon ~Ir. King by mail on
tlw 3rd day of October, 1~);)3. (R. 11) A motion for a
4
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more definite statement was filed requesting the hearing
committee to require the prosecution more specifically to
set forth the nature of the charges of unprofessional conduct. Particularly, with reference to the phrase, "knowingly permitted" the motion asserted that Mr. King
could not determine whether he was being charged with
having committed overt acts or with merely acquiescing
in the acts of others. Likewise, in being charged with
"permitting witnesses to fabricate evidence" it was also
urged that the accused could not determine whether the
evidence claimed to have been fabricated related to documentary evidence or whether it related to the fabrication
of oral testimony. (R. 13)
The motion for more definite statement was overruled without hearing and Mr. King thereupon through
his counsel filed an Answer denying the allegations of
the complaint in respect to any unprofessional conduct.
The matter was finally brought to trial on the 5th
day of May, 1956, at Provo, Utah, at which time counsel
for the prosecution posed the question if it were determined that Mr. King did not actually fabricate evidence
or permit anyone to testify falsely, "What was Mr.
King's duty under the Rules of Ethics of the Utah State
Bar in regard to a matter presented to the court which
he knew to be false~" (R. 47)
As its evidence in support of the charges made, the
prosecution offered ''The full transcript of the record
in the matter involving Locke vs. the Harsh Utah Corporation, and Mr. Schnitzer." (R. 64) In objecting to
the introduction of the full transcript of testimony
counsel for Mr. King stated that he had just overheard
5
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opposing counsel state that after the entire record had
been introduced in evidence they would move to amend
the complaint to conform to the proof in that it would
be further claimed and alleged that Mr. King was guilty
of professional misconduct in failing to advise the court
that perjury had been committed. (R. 70)
Thus, for the first time a charge was made that Mr.
King "had a duty to confer with his clients and then
divulge to the court the facts, the truth, respecting the
evidence concerning which false testimony had been
made.'' ( R. 72) After considerable discussion on this
matter, counsel for the prosecution were allowed to
amend their complaint by adding thereto the charge
''Knowingly refraining from divulging to the court the
truth concerning such evidence presented to it.'' (R. 8588) This amendment to the complaint was objected to
by counsel for Mr. King who sought to have the Hearing
Committee proceed with the hearing at that time upon
the charge made in the original complaint. (R. 89) However, not only was the amendment accepted but the hearing was continued to a future date.
The matter came on again for hearing on June 11,
1956, at which time ~Ir. John ~r. Sherman appeared at
counsel table with the attorneys for the prosecution.
\YhPll asked hy Mr. King's counsel as to the nature of
Mr. Sherman's appearance at the hearing, "Jir. Thomas
replied:
"He is here as a witness. He has been subpoened as a wi tnP~s, but he has been Yery helpful
in the a~~oeiation h~· way of adYire in an advisory
eapacit~· in thi~ matter, but he does not appear

6
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here as co-counsel. He merely appears as a witness." (R. 113)
The hearing before the committee was concluded on
the same day, the only persons appearing to testify in
the matter being Mr. Sherman, Mr. King, and Mr. Wayne
L. Black. The committee received Exhibits T 1 through
T 6; and the deposition of Harold J. Schnitzer, a witness
for the accused Mr. King, was published.
Following the hearing, the matter was argued by
counsel for the respective parties on August 6, 1956, and
thereafter on a date which does not appear from the
record but which was approximately November 1, 1956,
the hearing committee submitted its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in which it found in part as
follows:
"3. That during the course of said trial, and
particularly on June 10, 1954, in Davis County,
Utah, one Harold J. Schnitzer, one of the defendants, represented by said Dwight L. King, and
Walter E. Hutehison, Secretary of the defendant,
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, knowingly, while
under oath, testified falsely before the Court as
to dates and place upon and at which a resolution
and waiver of notice of directors of Harsh Utah,
a Corporation, had been prepared and signed by
the President and Secretary, respectively, of said
Corporation.
"4. That at the time the testimony was given
by the said Harold J. Schnitzer, and Walter E.
Hutchison, to wit: on June 10, 1954, as aforesaid,
the said Dwight L. King, one of counsel for
Harold J. Schnitzer, and Harsh Utah, a Corporation, knew that such testimony was false.
7
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"5. That the said Dwight L. King did not
disclose to the Court or to other counsel, true facts
as to the place and dates of the execution of such
waiver of notice of directors, and resolution of
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, until June 21, 1954,
at a time when said defendants began their case
in chief in such trial, although such Dwight L.
King, as counsel, had opportunity to do so.
"6. That the resolution of Harsh Utah, a Corporation, and the waiver of notice of directors of
Harsh Utah, a Corporation, were prepared by
Walter E. Hutchison in the office of Dwight L.
King, on the morning of June 10, 1954, and signed
by the said Harold J. Schnitzer, and Walter E.
Hutchison on that date."
Based upon the foregoing Findings, the Disciplinary
Committee determined as a Conclusion of L'iiw that ''The
said Dwight L. King violated the provisions of Rule III,
Sec. 32, Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41 of the revised rules
of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct
and discipline." (R. 281)
Thereafter, the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar, on February 1, 1957, made its recommendation
that Mr. l{ing be suspended from the practice of law in
this state for a period of six (6) months, (apparently
adopting the Findings and Conrlusions made by the
Hearing Committee). (R. 282)
STATEMENT OF POTXTS
In his Petitioner for ReYiew. Dwight L. l{ing set
forth his reasons for urging that the recommendation
and propo~t>d order of the Board of Bar Commissioners
art> without mPrit and should not be approYed. As broken
8
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down and segregated into points, they appear as follows :
1. The evidence is insufficient to support the implied
findings that Petitioner did not make a disclosure of the
facts of the false testimony to the court within a reasonable time. Under all the facts and circumstances of the
case, including the pressure being exerted upon Petitioner by the nature of the trial, the tactics and conduct
of opposing counsel, and the professional desire on the
part of Petitioner "to maintain inviolate the confidence"
and ''preserve the secrets of his client,'' Petitioner acted
with propriety and in keeping with the ethical standards
of the profession.

2. Neither the evidence nor the findings justify the
conclusion that Petitioner violated the provisions of Rule
III, Sec. 32, Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41, Revised Rules
of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct
and discipline.
3. The evidence does not justify the recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners that Petitioner
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months.
The foregoing points will be analyzed and discussed
in this brief under the following headings :

I.
PETITIONER DID NOT UNREASONABLY DELAY
REPORTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY TO THE COURT.
9
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II.
PE~ITIONER'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE SUBPARAGRAPHS 15 OR 41 OF SECTION 32, RULE III,
REVISED RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.

III.
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW.

ARGUMENT

I.
PETITIONER DID NOT UNREASONABLY DELAY
REPORTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY TO THE COURT.

Although the amended complaint charged Petitioner
with knowingly permitting witnesses to fabricate evidence and testify falsely, as well as ''knowingly refraining from divulging the truth to the court or parties concerning such evidence and testimony,'' the Hearing Committee failed to find against Petitioner on the first ground
of the charge. The only finding of any alleged misconduct
appears in Finding No. 5 to the effect that Dwight L.
King failed to disclose to the court or to other counsel
the true facts with respect to the execution of the waiYer
of notieP and the resolution of the directors until the 21st
dny of June, 19:)4-, when he had opportunity to do so.
This finding was not disturbed h~· the Board of Bar CommissionPrs and therefore must be deemed to have been
10
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approved. Likewise, since the Board of Commissioners
failed to make any further findings or conclusions, it
must be taken as accepted that the Board exonerated
Dwight L. King of any other alleged misconduct.
Petitioner's position at the hearing was, and now
is, that if he had a duty to disclose the facts to court and
counsel he did so within a reasonable time under all the
facts and circumstances of the case. In order to have a
full and complete picture of such circumstances, it is
necessary to give a description of the transactions and
occurrences surrounding the incident complained of. In
doing this, we must not only refer to the testimony before
the Hearing Committee, but also to the testimony in the
original case, entitled Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company, et al. vs. Harsh Utah Corporation and Harold J.
Schnitzer. This Court is undoubtedly well aware of the
record in that case since the decision of the trial court
in Davis County was appealed to this Court. The decision rendered on appeal is reported in 5 Utah 2nd 244,
300 P. 2d 610. However, since some of the facts which
we feel are pertena.nt here may have been obscure or
lost in the voluminous record before the court we will
attempt to summarize the facts briefly.
The particular matter with which we are concerned
involved the claim of Alvin T. Locke, an intervening
Plaintiff, against the Harsh Utah Corporation and Harold J. Schnitzer. The actual hearing of Locke's case
began on Tuesday, June the 8th, 1954. (R. 133) Prior
thereto, ~Ir. Sherman, Locke's attorney, obtained information concerning the room in which Mr. Schnitzer would
be registered at the Hotel Utah. On the Sunday before
11
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the 8th, Mr. Sherman obtained a key to the room which
would be later assigned to Mr. Schnitzer and took a Mr.
Don H. Terry to the room. Mr. Terry then wired the
room for the purpose of eavesdropping on all conversations which might take place therein and for the purpose
of recording such conversations. A microphone was
placed over the window of the room, and a wire led from
the microphone to a suite of connecting rooms down the
hall and around the corner occupied by :Jfr. Terry and
Mr. Sherman. (R. 142, 143, 161) During the ensuing days
of the trial many, if not all, of the conversations taking
place in Mr. Schnitzer's rooms were monitered and over~
heard by Mr. Terry, and tape recordings of some parts
of these conversations were made.
The first person called by l\Ir. Sherman to be examined, was the Defendant, Harold J. Schnitzer, President
of Harsh Utah Corporation. l\fr. Schnitzer took the stand
on the afternon of Tuesday, June 8th, and was interrogated by l\fr. Sherman the balance of that day and lal
day of the 9th. (R. 130, 134) During this examination,
reference was made to the minute book of the Harsh
Utah Corporation. l\Ir. Schnitzer testified that this
minute book was in the possession of the secretary· of
the corporation, a Mr. \Yalter Hutchinson of Portland,
Oregon. When l\f r. Sherman continued to press his
examination concerning the corporate minute book, l\Ir.
N<'lmitzer advised 1\[r. Sherman that 1\[r. Hutchinson was
comjng 1o Salt Lake City and that he would be requested
to bring tlw minute book with him and that :J[r. Schnitzer
wonld produce it in court. (R. 1-l-8)
1~
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Mr. Hutchinson arrived in Salt Lake City on the
evening of June 9, 1954, and came to the hotel room
occupied by Mr. Schnitzer. There was some conversation about the minute book which Mr. Hutchinson had
brought with him. It was decided that it would be advisable to discuss the testimony which Mr. Hutchinson,
(an expert on federal housing matters) was going to give
in court while he was in Utah with Dr. Dwight King
before court the next day. Mr. King was called on the
phone, invited to meet with the others the following
morning for breakfast. This conversation and other discussion between the parties, including some telephone
conversations, were overheard and recorded by Mr.
Terry in his room down the hall. At the hearing before
the Committee, Petitioner produced these tape recordings and requested the Committee to hear as much of
the monitered conversations as it desired. A portion of
the recording relating to the morning of June 10, 1954,
was played several times. (R. 193-198)
The following morning, Mr. King met Mr. Schnitzer
and Mr. Hutchinson and had breakfast with them at the
hotel, after which he came to the hotel room. During the
course of the discussion, reference was made to typing
certain minutes which belonged in the corporate minute
book. According to the undisputed testimony of Mr.
King, he was requested to allow Mr. Hutchinson, who
was an attorney as well as secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation, use of a stenographer for the purpose of having
the minutes typed and put into the minute book. Mr.
King understood that the minutes had been prepared
but were not in final form and therefore required typing.

13
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The conversation in the hotel room between Mr. King
and Mr. Hutchinson, related to the testimony Mr. Hutchinson was to give on the federal housing matters. (R.
250) The parties finally left to go to Mr. King's office
where the minutes were to be typed up. The uncontradicted testimony is that upon the arrival at Mr. King's
office, Mr. King allowed Mr. Hutchinson the use of his
office and secretary for the purpose of having the minutes
typed up. Mr. King further testified that Mr. Hutchinson
had in his possession and appeared to be dictating from
documents and papers which he, ~Ir. King, assumed were
the minutes which were being typed and prepared in
final form. (R. 253, 254) Because of the delay involved
in the typing of the minutes, it was necessary to call the
court and request a postponement of the starting time
that morning. (R. 252) When the people arrived at the
courthouse, l\Ir. Sherman again put :Jlr. Schnitzer on the
stand and began to examine him relative to the corporate
minute book, which at that time was produced and handed
to ~Ir. Sherman. Keeping ii1 mind, that :Jlr. Terry had
already monitered the conversation regarding the parties
going to Mr. King's office where the minutes were to be
t~·ped up, ~[r. Sherman proceeded to cross-examine ~Ir.
Schnitzer regarding the minute book and, by leading and
~uggPHtive questions invited l\Ir. Schnitzer to testify that
the minutPR had been prepared and signed approximately
n ~·par before in Portland, Oregon. Finally, Mr. SchnitZPl' broke down and stated that the minutes had actually
hePn signed h~r him that morning. Thereupon, :Mr. Sherman prorePded to go into the matter of the waiver of the
uotire of the meeting (whirh had also been prepared that

14
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morning), and finally obtained a statement from Mr.
Schnitzer that the waiver of the meeting had actually
been prepared and signed at the time the meeting was
held a year before.
In the present hearing, Sherman testified he could
observe from the appearance of the two documents that
they had been prepared on the same typewriter and
similar in appearance. (R. 178, 179) He also testified
in response to a question by a member of the Hearing
Committee:
''MR. COLTON: Mr. Sherman, which of these
days did you find out this testimony was perjured~
''WITNESS : I first found it out on the lOth
of June.
''MR: COLTON: Is that why you were examining the witness Mr. Schnitzer~

"WITNESS: Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchison on the tenth of June, yes.''
Following Mr. Sherman's examination, Mr. King
was given an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Schnitzer,
but he stated that he had no cross-examination "at that
time." During the noon hour, Mr. King and Mr. Bleak,
(who was associate counsel during the trial) had a discussion with Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson. Mr.
Schnitzer was rebuked severely for having testified
falsely. Mr. Black's testimony of what transpired is
particularly descriptive:
''A. My recollection is that the conversation
commenced before we ra_rived at the place where
we ate that noon. As a matter of fact the discussion started as soon as we arrived at Mr. King's

15
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station wagon and continued while we were traveling to the place where we ate, which was an establishment known as Wild Horse Charlie's I believe,
where we customarily ate, and it continued during
the course of the meal at Wild Horse Charlie's.

"Q. Is Wild Horse Charlie's down some distance south of Farmington~
"A. Yes, it is on the main highway.

"Q. Relate what conversation you heard or
overheard between these parties and what part of
the conversation you took part in, if any.
''A. Mr. King, about the first time that we
were alone and together in his automobile stated
to Mr. Schnitzer that he was shocked; that he had
never been the victim of such conduct on the part
of counsel or of a client, since he had been practicing law. That his evasion and his refusal to be
frank and tell the truth on the witness stand was
shocking to him. And that he had completely lost
the confidence and the respect of the court, and he
didn't know'' Q. That who had completely lost the confidence of the court~

"A. ~Ir. Schnitzer had, and he didn't know
what was going to come of the situation from that
point on.
'' Q. Was anything mentioned with respect to
l\lr. Hutchinson testifying or the probability of
his testifying later a bout the same act 1

''A. Without trying to recollect the exact
words that were spoken, which I certainly can't
do at this time, l\Ir. Hutchinson's response to that
was 'Well, Dwig-ht, I think that you are giving
this far more importance than it actually has.' He
~aid, 'I don '1 think this has an~· significance in

16
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the case. It can't possibly make any difference.'
And he said 'I don't think there is going to be
any further questioning about it and I think you
are unduly alarmed by this situation.'

"Q. Did Mr. King make any statement to Mr.
Hutchinson, as to what his attitude should be
about these minutes if he were called to testify?
''A. Mr. King's response to Mr. Hutchison,
and this part of the conversation took place while
we were eating after we had arrived at Wild
Horse Charlie's as I recall, the first part of the
conversation was confined more to the discussion
back and forth between Mr. King and Mr. Schnitzer. But as we were eating at Wild Horse
Charlie's, Mr. I{ing said to Mr. Hutchinson that
he thought that attorneys have frequently had to
assume responsibility for their own neglect and
for their own failure to perform their duties towards a client and he thought Mr. Hutchinson
ought to go back on the witness stand and if he
was asked any questions about this matter to be
perfectly frank and perfectly honest about the
preparation of the minutes and the resolution.

'' Q. It was a fact, was it not, that Mr. Hutchinson was the Secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation and the testimony indicated that it was
his responsibility to prepare the minutes'
''A. Yes. Mr. King as I recall, also asked
'Now what is the fact about this resolution and
the minutes and the waiver' I want to know what
the facts are?' Mr. Hutchinson said, 'Well the
meeting was held. There is no question about
that.' And he said 'I have a lot of things to do
and I am busy and I don't know. I was just slow
in getting them prepared and as a matter of fact
the time crept up on me and I didn't have them
ready.'

17
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'' Q. I think you stated something to the effect
that Mr. King said 'You should get back on the
stand.' Had Mr. Hutchinson been on the stand
at that time~

"A. I misstated myself. He had not been on
the stand but it was anticipated that he would go
on that afternoon.''
Notwithstanding the discussion at lunch, when Mr.
Hutchinson was called to the witness stand by Mr. Sherman, he proceeded to corroborate Mr. Schnitzer's version in respect to the time of signing of the minutes and
the waiver of the notice of the Board meeting.
After Mr. Sherman's examination of Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. King again stated that he had no cross-examination at that time. Mr. Sherman continued to present his
case every day of the trial from then until the 21st day
of June. On Friday, the 18th of June, ~lr. Sherman
called a Mr. Percy Goddard to testify that the minutes
of the meeting and the waiver of the notice of the meeting
had been prepared on the same typewriter at approximately the same time. ~lr. Sherman also called Mr.
Terry who testified in some detail concerning conversations allegedly overheard by him on the wired connections with ~Ir. Schnitzer's room.
Not only did ~[r. Terry testify as to what he claimed
was said, he also purported to identify the various
persons who made the alleged statements, notwithstanding- it appears from the reeord that the only time that he
<'\'er ac>1 ually confronted the partirs who had talked was
when hP :lppt>ared in eourt on the afternoon of June 18th
to gin• his tPstimmi~'· (R. 163. 164)
18
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Although the Hearing Committee found that Mr.
King did not make a disclosure of facts to the trial court
or opposing counsel until June 21, 1954, the record does
show that Mr. King endeavored to on the afternoon of
June 17, and was prevented from doing so by the tactics
of Mr. Sherman, who refused to accept any stipulation
unless Mr. King acknowledged that he and Mr. Black
participated in the preparation of the records. I quote:
''I will continue with the examination, unless
you want to make a complete stipulation the documents were prepared by Mr. Hutchinson, yourself,
Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer in your office.
"MR. KING: Mr. Hutchinson, I understand,"I offer the stipulation, and you can either
leave or take, that stipulation is that you, yourself, and Mr. Schnitzer, Mr. Black and Mr. Hutchinson were there.
"MR. KING: I won't stipulate to that. I had
nothing to do with preparing the minutes.'' (R.
153, 154)
Why Mr. King would have any duty to disclose the
facts with respect to the preparation of the documents
to opposing counsel when the latter appeared to have
all the facts and was attempting to distort them so as to
implicate Mr. King and Mr. Black in the matter is not
known. However, the record in the Harsh Utah Corporation Case, supra, as well as the testimony before the
Hearing Committee, amply demonstrates the difficult
circumstances under which Mr. King was attempting to
try the case. We readily concede that Mr. Sherman is
not on trial in these proceedings (although there is much
19
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evidence to indicate that he should have been censored
by the trial court on numerous occasions for his conduct) ;
but his method of operating and proceeding in the trial
furnishes explanation for the determination by Mr. King
and Mr. Black to wait until Sherman was through with
the presentation of his evidence before having Schnitzer
and Hutchinson make a formal retraction.

In

explaining, on Cross-examination, why a more
immediate disclosure was not made, Mr. Black testified:
''A. Well, I suppose there were a complexity
of reasons why it wasn't corrected on that occasion, Mr. Thomas. I can only relate my own impressions about the matter, which would be this.
That this was a very shocking and a very unusual
occurrence, the testimony that had occurred on
the lOth. It was an occurrence that had called into
being a number of problems; the first problem
being to attempt to correct the testimony at that
time with the possibility that it would be tantamount to the confession of a criminal act on the
part of our client, whom we represented and
whose interests we were endeaYoring to protect.
That problem had to be explored. The next problem that had to be explored was the welfare of
our case which was being tried. \V e couldn't completely a bandon any kind of a plan or any kind
of an organized thinking in connection with the
ultimate outcome of the lawsuit in hand. So we
had the problem of deciding when would be the
most strategically proper time to correct this testimony. And then we had the problem which was
a \TPry serious one of convincing a stubborn client
and a stubborn law~·pr as to what should be done
and how to do it, and what would be the best
yn·oepdure on that subject. And between all of
thos<' problems that combined and came together,
::!0
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plus the fact that this lawsuit was still continuing
in a rapid fire manner with Mr. Sherman moving
with his customary mental agility from one subject to the other and jumping from one subject to
the other, and trying to keep up with what he was
doing, I for one can't conceive of any lawyer who
under those circumstances could reflect calmly and
considerately and have canons of ethics in mind
and determine what the proper thing for a lawyer
to do would be under those circumstances, and
come to a conclusion on all of those matters in
the space of one day. That is why we didn't correct the testimony with Mr. Hutchinson on the
11th day of June, 1954.
First of all we have a situation where Mr. Sherman
had access to all of the confidential conversations taking
place between Mr. King's client, Mr. Schnitzer and other
persons coming to the hotel room. This enabled Mr.
Sherman to anticipate defenses and to produce evidence
which would not otherwise be available to him, and generally to confuse and harass opposing counsel in respect
to any cross-examination or interrogation of witnesses
called by Mr. Sherman.
Next we have the attitude of Mr. Sherman in the trial
itself. There is no doubt but that his belligerence and
domineering attitude toward l\f r. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson (as well as the manner in which he framed the
questions) was primarily responsible for the perjured
testimony in the original instance. As testified by Mr.
Schnitzer in his deposition:
''A. Mr. Sherman's attitude in questioning
me, particularly at that particular morning, was,
it appeared to me, was to unnerve me. He came
practically up to my face, and shouted in my face,
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slammed records on the Judge's desk, in, it seemed
to me, an effort to unnerve me and upset me.''
(Deposition p. 14)
Mr. Schnitzer was corroborated by Mr. Black who
testified:
''A. Mr. Sherman that morning and on all
other occasions when he questioned Mr. Schnitzer
stood next to him and adopted a manner as though
shaking a finger in his face and talking in a rather
loud and bullying fashion, and his mannerisms
and his demeanor towards l\Ir. Schnitzer was so
obviously antagonistic and hateful toward him it
aroused a similar response in Mr. Schnitzer and
the two of them day after day and throughout the
proceeding continued in that hostile and antagonistic attitude that they evinced toward one another.'' (R. 208)
It is the opinion of the writer of this brief, and such
opinion is submitted to this Court for its consideration,
that ~fr. Sherman was not interested in obtaining from
~[r. Hutchinson or l\1r. Srhnitzer the truth with respect
to the preparation of the corporate minutes when he
examined these individuals on June 10, 1954. The manner
in which his examination was conducted, as indicated
above, together with the language in which the questions
wen' courhed, clearly indicates that ~Ir. Sherman was
more interested in having a misrepresentation made by
the wihwss with respect to the preparation of minutes
than a correct representation. Sinre 'J[r. Sherman could
not dispute the fad that the mPPting of the directors was
aetna lly held and that the action was taken as reflected in
tlw minuteR, the only purpORl~ ·which could be serYed by
showing that the minutes had not been prepared until
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the morning of June 10, 1954, was to discredit the testimony of Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson. Obviously,
this could be accomplished more effectively if the witnesses themselves were induced to misrepresent the facts
with respect to the execution of the minutes. This would
also cast more doubt and suspicion upon any other testimony which they might give in the case. We submit that
Mr. Sherman wanted to win the case on behalf of his
client by influencing the court not as to the merits of
his client's position but as to the lack of respect for the
individuals who were defendants in the case.
This is further evident by the fact that after the
case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Mr. Sherman
used an insidious method of further intimidating the
Defendant Schnitzer. Not only did Mr. Sherman file the
original complaint against Mr. King in this matter, but
also while the appeal in the case of Pacific States Cast
Iron Pipe Company v. Harsh Utah Corporation, supra,
was pending before this Court, he wrote a letter to an
attorney by the name of Walter H. Evans in Portland,
Oregon, and mailed a copy of the letter to Mr. Schnitzer
in which reference was made to the appeal, as follows:

"From all the information I can gather, it
would appear that the Utah Supreme Court will
make a decision on the Utah matter within the
next couple of weeks, and I fully expect a decision
well in advance of the first day of July. In this
regard, we have cross-appealed, asking for total
of $363,895.20 and from all the information I can
gather we will be successful in a substantial portion of our cross-appeal. In this event, there are
insufficient funds in the State of Utah to secure
our judgment in the state of Oregon against other
23
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assets of Schnitzer and his various corporations.''
(Italics added)
This letter (Exhibit T 6 in the instant matter) contains repeated innuendos to the effect that the decision
of the Supreme Court of this State in favor of Locke and
against Schnitzer is assured, some of which follow:
"We have also been delaying in the filing of
our final brief in Montana, in sincere hopes that
the Utah Supreme Court will make its decision
prior to the time that briefs must be filed in
Montana. Because of certain points covered in
the opinion of the trial court in ~fontana, it would
be most helpful to have a final judgment in Utah
in presenting our appeal.''
Also:
"It is entirely possible that prior to the time
that it is necessary to file pleadings in response
to the action that Harsh Construction Company
has started, that we will have obtained a judgment
from the Supreme Court in Utah in excess of the
amount on deposit there securing our judgment.''

Again:
''I am very confident that ultimately we will
obtain a judgment in ~Iontana equal to the amount
or in excess of the amount that we will obtain in
Utah, but my better judgment has been to delay
pushing the action in :\Iontana until we have received a final determination from the Supreme
Court in U tab.''
The letter goes on to state that unless "Jir. Schnitzer
will accede to the demands and claims of :\Ir. Sherman
and his client Locke, that l\lr. Schnitzer will be unable
to make :my sale or dif'position of his property:
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"Both Mr. Locke and I have spent considerable time in Washington, D. C. during the past
year. We found that Schnitzer's reputation for
underhanded dealings with the various branches
of the Military is quite famous. I am satisfied that
Schnitzer himself would not receive favorable consideration in attempting to dispose of his own
properties beca.use of his past dealings with the
Government. On the other hamd, Mr. Locke arnd
myself an.d others connected with our construction
company have been very fortunate in establishing
a most congenial relationship with all branches of
the Government on certain Government contracts
that our present construction company is engaged
in, and I am satisfied through connections we have
established, could dispose of, or assist in disposing of, Mr. Schnitzer's Wherry Housing Projects
to his substantial advantage, but of course we
would not entertain anything of this nature until
such time as our cla.ims and judgments were satis·fied in full.
"My experience has been that in dealing with
the United States Government the most advantageous transactions can be consummated by being
the first to take advantage of any new legislation,
such as the program to purchase Wherry Housing
Projects. However, beca.use of the pending litigation a,nd judgments, it is impossible for Schnitzer to take advantage of this fa.ct, and he would
undoubtedly lose again, just as he has in the past,
by reason of his not being 'willing to make final
settlement with Jllr. Locke." (Italics added)
On cross-examination in the instant matter, Mr.
Sherman admitted sending a copy of the above letter to
~Ir. Schnitzer but denied that his purpose in sending it
was to use a psychological force in effecting a settlement
of Locke's claim in the case of Pa('ific Rtates Cast Iron

25
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Pipe Company v. Harsh Utah Corporation. (R. 160)
Although it is most difficult to reconstruct the actual
conditions which existed during the trial of the case, the
facts outlined above should be of assistance to this Court
in understanding the tension and extreme pressure under
which Mr. King was laboring. With this in mind, let us
proceed to discuss the events which transpored between
June lOth, {the date on which the false testimony was
given), and June 21st, (the date on which a complete and
full disclosure thereof was made by Mr .. Schnitzer and
Mr. Hutchinson). Mr. Sherman was in the process of
presenting the case for his client Mr. Locke from June
8th, (which was a Tuesday), until June 21st. The lOth
of June was on a Thursday and the false testimony given
by Mr. Schnitzer occurred in the morning of that day,
while the false testimony of Mr. Hutchinson occurred in
the afternoon. Immediately following the testimony of
Mr. Hutchinson in the afternoon of June lOth, Mr. Sherman proceeded to call other witnesses and to examine
them on the afternon of June lOth and the morning of
June 11th. In the afternoon of Friday, June 11th, :Mr.
King endeavored to get the court's permission to put Mr.
Hutchinson back on the stand to testify with respect to
the special matter for which he had been called from
Portland, Oregon. This matter related to the lump sum
contract and unless he was allowed to testify then, he
woulrl have to remain over until the next week.
At first Mr. Sherman objerted, and the court allowed
Mr. ~herman to proceed with other witnesses until approximately one-half an hour before the time of adjournment. .At that time l\f r. King again interrupted and the
26
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court allowed Mr. King to put Mr. Hutchinson on the
stand to testify with respect to the lump sum contract.
Some claim has been made that Mr. King should at that
time have attempted to correct the record in respect to
Mr. Hutchinson's testimony. However, it must be borne
in mind that the time was very limited in which Mr. King
could examine Mr. Hutchinson with respect to the matter
involving the merits of the case and at that time, Mr.
King and Mr. Black were still endeavoring to ascertain
what the best means would be of correcting the record.
Following Mr. Hutchinson's testimony on the afternoon of Friday, June the 11th, the court adjourned until
Monday morning June the 14th. Mr. Sherman continued
to present Locke's case Monday the 14th, Tuesday the
15th, Wednesday the 16th, Thursday the 17th, and Friday
the 18th. Again the court adjourned on Friday afternoon, the 18th, until Monday morning June the 21st and
it was on this day that Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson got on the stand as the first witnesses called by Mr.
King in presenting the defense.
Certainly when the false testimony was given on the
lOth of June by Th1:r. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson, both
~Ir. Black and Mr. King were deeply shocked and considerably worried as to how the record should be corrected to the best interest of their clients. The question
whether the individuals could be relieved of the perjury
if they got on the stand and recanted was before counsel.
Mr. Black's testimony as to the position counsel were in
and as to the course which they followed in ascertaining
and determining what should be done is as follows:
27
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"Q. Did Mr. King consult with you with
reference to what should be the position that he
should take, and that of his client, Mr. Schnitzer,
with reference to what they had stated on the
lOth~

''A. Yes. The first opportunity I believe that
we had to actually sit down and discuss the subject
was on Saturday. Because Friday of course Mr.
King was extremely busy and at the end of the
day of trial work we separated immediately upon
arriving back in Salt Lake and we didn't have an
opportunity to actually discuss the matter except
in our proceedings in Farmington and Salt Lake.
But on Saturday we were both in the office together and we were both working toward discovering what the law was with respect to recantation
of perjury and the effect recantation would have
legally upon the party involved, so that we could
apprise ourselves of just what our legal problem
was.

"Q. When you speak of perjury, are you refering to the testimony Mr. Schnitzer and Mr.
Hutchinson had given on the lOth 1
"A. I was. And my advice to :Jlr. King, and
he heartily agreed with me, was this. I stated to
Mr. King that there was only one course that we
could possibly follow in this case, that there was
only one way that we could ever rehabilitate Mr.
Schnitzer in the eyes of the court and re-establish
his credibility in this case and that was for him
to get back on this witness stand and tell the absolute truth about this matter and to correct the
record. And furthermore, I adYised Mr. King and
he heartily agreed with me, we had a complete
meeting of the minds on it, that we should by all
means bend eYer~' effort to get .1\Ir. Hutchinson to
come back to Salt Lake at the proper time and
that the best time as far as our case was con28
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cerned, and correct his testimony as well. We
discussed the very serious situation that confronted Mr. Hutchinson, being a member of the
bar of his state, and attorney at law, and the effect
this might have on him. But our feeling on it as
we discussed it, was that he had gotten himself
into this thing over the advice that Mr. King had
given him and against the wishes of counsel
handling the case and that it was just one of those
unfortunate situations where he had gotten himself into this situation and he would have to get
himself out.

"Q. You said he had gotten into it "over"
the advice. You mean-'
"A. Against the advice of Mr. King.
'' Q. Did you and Mr. King do some research
as to recantation'
''~I\..

Yes, we did.

'' Q. Do you recall reading a case as to the
testimony of Senator Norris'

''A. Yes.

"Q. What was the effect of that case, so far
as your determination as to whether any recantation on the part of either Schnitzer or Hutchinson would avoid perjury'
''A. We satisfied ourselves, and of course the
Norris case is clear that recantation, no matter
how soon it was given after perjury on the witness
stand, will not cleanse the record of perjury, but
on the contrary it will be nothing more or less
than a confession of guilt.
'' Q. Then in respect to your conclusion, you
say you and Mr. King concurred in and were
unanimous in, what was the purpose of having
Mr. Schnitzer and 1\lr. Hutchinson get beak on the
29
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stand or resolving that they should get back on
the stand and clear the record?
"A. Well, the thing that was foremost in our
minds and of greatest importance to us was the
conviction that we had, as a result of observing
the situation, that the court had lost confidence in
our client and that the court unquestionably had
come to the conclusion that he was unworthy of
belief, and our primary concern was to re-establish the integrity of our client in the eyes of the
court and to correct the record for that reason."
(R. 208-210)
Mr. King, on cross-examination, explained the problem similarly:

'' Q. Now when this thing started to unfold in
court, the falsity of the testimony of Mr. Schnitzer, as I suppose it started to unfold on the lOth
of J nne, and then subsequent to that time you and
Mr. Black decided upon a course of action and as
you have stated, I believe, you were somewhat
confused and didn't know what direction to turn
or what to do. I think that was in substance Mr.
Black's testimony.
''A. No, I don't think we didn't know which
way to turn. We were very much aware that these
men were in an extremely dangerous position.
That they were men of substance and character in
the eommunity and there was a Yer}T difficult problem. First we had this job of informing the court
concerning the truth of the matter and as a secondary consideration we had the welfare of Mr. Hutehinson. You might not know it but he is about
Rixty years old, a Yery dignified appearing person,
and an intelligent man and I considered very carefully the course we were to take.

'' Q. Some time before the actual testimony of
and of Goddard, I believe you and Mr.

~PetT~'
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Black concluded that the record should be corrected. Can you fix about when that took place1
Was it over the week end when you had the opportunity to talk to Mr. Black that that occurred 1
''A. We concluded that the record should be
corrected during the lunch hour, before we even
got out of Wild Horse Charlie's and that is what
I told Mr. Hutchinson to do. I told him to correct
that record and I told Mr. Schnitzer to do it too.

"Q. That was the lOth, wasn't it1
"A. That was the day it occurred and there
wasn't any ifs, ands, or buts about that, and there
wasn't any equivocation on the instructions. But
they didn't correct the record that afternoon and
that night we began to thrash around and try to
resolve the problems we were confronted with."
(R. 270, 271)
Mr. Schnitzer, in his deposition, testified that not
only had they agreed to correct the record at the first
available opportunity, but that a transcript on the testimony had been ordered prior to the 17th of June, in
order that the specific statements could be referred to
and corrected as made :
''MR. THOMAS: Q. Well, Mr. Schnitzer,This is on the record- when you finally did
decide that it would be proper for you to take the
stand again and testify in respect to the truth
and to put Walter Hutchinson back on the stand
to testify to the truth at that time Mr. Hutchinson
was not in Salt Lake City, and you called him back
from wherever he was to so testify. That's correct, is it not?
"A. That is exactly right. Walter left immediately after he testified on the stand on June lOth,
and we wouldn't have had an earlier opportunity
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until Mr. King took over the case, and it was at
that precise time that I was put on the stand and
Mr. Walter Hutchinson was put on the stand to
clear this record.
"Q. Now, what I am trying to get at, Mr.
Schnitzer, is when Mr. King decided to put you
back on the stand prior to the testimony of Mr.
Terry.
''A. I can't give you the exact date, but I can
say this: that we had discussed it, and we had
ordered-Mr. King had ordered a transcript of
that particular portion of the testimony from myself and Mr. Hutchinson of June lOth well before
Terry ever was brought to the stand, so that
prove conclusively that we were thinking and
planning the correction of these particular statements.

'' Q. Did he order a transcript prior to the
testimony of Percy Goddard, do you know 1
''A. I don't recall exactly in the space of time
that Goddard came in, but I believe-it is my
recollection-! might be wrong-that the transcript was ordered the afternoon or the next
Monday after the testimony of June lOth." (Deposition, page 43, 44)
Implicit in the finding by the Hearing Committee
that the accused Mr. King, did not disclose all of the
facts to the court and opposing counsel until June 21,
1954 is the conclusion that it was ~Ir. King's duty to
disclose such facts some time prior to that date. When
he should have disclosed the facts is not determined.
Should he han? disclosed them immediately at the time
of 1he false testimony f Certainly from the record it
would appPar that no one "Tas deceived by the testimony
si II<'<' l\1r. Sherman testified that he knew both Schnitzer
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and Hutchinson were lying; and Mr. Black testified that
although he at that time knew nothing about the typing
of the minutes, it was very obvious that Schnitzer was
"guilty of falsehood by evasion at least." (R. 211)
Exhaustive research on the subject has resulted in
finding one case quite similar in point where the question
of the duty to disclose and the responsibility of an attorney for failing to disclose was involved. In the case of
In Re Hoover, (Ariz. 1935) 46 P. 2d 647, the attorney
was charged, among other things, with the following misconduct:
"1. For purchasing on November 16, 1933, a
bottle of cough syrup during the progress of ~
case, State of Arizona v. Rola Marlow, No. 1890,
then pending in the Superior Court of Yuma
County, State of Arizona, in which case you represented the defendant, giving the bottle of cough
syrup so purchased to the defendant, Marlow, and
permitting him to testify under oath that he, the
defendant, Marlow, had purchased the said bottle
of cough syrup just prior to the time when he was
arrested.''

Hoover, the accused attorney, had represented Marlow on a drunk driving charge. During the course of the
trial, Hoover put Marlow on the stand to testify with
respect to the matter. On cross-examination by the
attorney for the state, Marlow testified that the odor of
alcohol which had been discerned by the police officer at
the time of his arrest was the odor of cough syrup. At
that time, Marlow took a bottle of cough syrup from his
pocket, which had been partly consumed, and testified
that this was the bottle from which he had been drinking.
Upon heing questioned as to where he had obtained the
33
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bottle he testified that he had purchased it at Minor's
Drug Store prior to the time of the arrest. In fact, however, the actual bottle of cough syrup which he produced
had been purchased by the attorney, Hoover, during the
course of the trial. Hoover had given it to Marlow, according to Hoover's statement, with the understanding
that Marlow would identify it as being a bottle similar
to that from which he had been drinking at the time of
his arrest. The Board of Governors of the Arizona Bar
found Marlow guilty of misconduct and recommended
that he be reprimanded in respect thereto. In holding
the evidence was insufficient to justify any reprimand, the
Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
''Plainly it was respondent's duty, when his
client incorrectly and falsely stated that he bought
the medicine himself, to endeavor by questions put
to him to elicit the correct and truthful answer.
This duly he owed to his client, to the court, and
to himself. While a lawyer owes the duty to his
client of seeing that his rights are fully protected
under the forms of the law, he is never justified
in imposing upon the court or knowingly permitting his client to do so by testifying falsely. We
think that an experienced right-thinking lawyer,
under the circumstances, would have felt impelled
to take steps, before his client left the witness
stand or during the trial, to haYe him correct his
testimony. Beca.usP respondent did not do so, however, we cannot concludr that his silrrrce was
necessarily a studied effort to impose upon the
conrt, or a wilful disregard of the ethical standa-rds of the profession .. It wa,.~ in the midst of the
tria1 and respondent dou.btlrss 1ca.s taken unau.'arf's and did not eJ:pecf or think that his client
wo"!d makr such a statf'ment. Under such circum34
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stances, the wisest most experienced lawyer might
hesitate to elicit the real truth for fear of jeopardizing his client's ca.se. There was nothing unethical in respondent's buying the medicine for
illustrative purposes in the trial, if done openly
and above board. The truth about the purchase of
the bottle would have answered as well or better
than a lie. There was no reason for the respondent
to have incited Marlow to swear falsely, and we
do not think that he did. The most that can be
said is that he remained silent when he should
have spoken. We do not think that respondent's
conduct in the Marlow case merits his disbarrment,
suspension or reproval. We are satisfied if like
circumstances ever arise in his practice he will
act more ethically and more wisely.'' (Italics
added.)
The conduct of the attorney in the Hoover Case is
far more questionable than the conduct of Mr. King in
the instant matter. In the Hoover Case, the attorney not
only set the stage for what took place (by buying the
cough syrup and delivering it to the defendant), but he
also allowed his client to take advantage of the false and
perjured testimony by not correcting it before the case
was completed. In the instant matter, the attorneys had
nothing to do with the production of the testimony nor
with the testimony itself. And subsequently the matter
was corrected before the case was ever submitted to the
court so that there could have been no prejudice result.
As will hereinafter be urged, there seems to be no reason
why the attorney who has not caused the false statement
to be made should not be permitted to make a disclosure
to the court at any time hefore the client appears to have
obtained an unfair advantage by reason of the perjured

35

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or false testimony.
Our court has on more than one occasion announced
the rule with respect to the degree of proof necessary to
establish misconduct on the part of an attorney. In the
case of In Re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158 Pac. 778, the
court stated the rule as follows:
''To disbar an attorney is a very serious
matter indeed. It not only may deprive him of
gaining a livelihood for himself and a dependent
family, but it may, and usually does, result in
preventing him from making available all antecedent preparation, although that may cover practically the period of a lifetime. In no other calling
are such far-reaching consequences visited upon
a delinquent who has not been found guilty of
some felonious act. The rule, therefore, that the
evidence should be clear a;nd convincing is based
upon a most solid foundation. (Italics added.)
Again in In Re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 Pac.
2d 13, the court stated :
''The standard or quantum of proof which
should govern this court in such a review was
stated in Re Hanson, supra, at page 167 of 48
Utah, at page 779 of 158 P. to be: '• • • "the
charges should be clearly sustained by convincing
proof and a fair prepondenance of the evidence.''
* * * the evidence should be clear and convincing
"" * * '
''And in Re Evans & Rogers, 22 Utah 366, 387,
62 P. 913, 919, 53 L.R.A. 952, 83 Am. St. Rep. 794;
'The summary proceeding of disbarment is civil,
and not criminal. 6 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 709; Matter
of Randel, 158 N. Y. (216) 219, 51 N. E. 1106;
State v. Clarke, 46 Iowa 155. In that proceeding,
howPVPr, more th::.n a preponderanre of the evi36
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dence is required. The guilt of the attorney must
be clearly established.' ''
A general annotation on the subject may be found
in 105 A.L.R. 984, 987.
In the case of In Re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E.
2d 807, the court held that a lawyer will not be subjected
to discipline merely upon suspicious circumstances, citing an earlier case where the court had held:
"In order for a recommendaiton of disbarment
to stand there must be not only a charge of moral
turpitude but also proof of the charge made. The
proof, we have consistently announced, must be
of a convincing character. Suspicious circumstances do not suffice. The proof must be clear
and convincing." In Re Amaden, 380 Ill. 545, 44
N.E. 2d 558.
The foregoing authorities, when considered in the
light of the testimony in the instant matter, not only
establish that Mr. King did not act unreasonably under
all the circumstances of this case, but support the other
propositions urged in this Brief, to the effect that the
rharges against him should be dismissed.
II.
PETITIONER'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE SUBpARAGRAPHS 15 OR 41 OF SECTION 32, RULE III,
REVISED RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.

While the amended complaint filed in this case
against ~Ir. King, and the finding of the Hearing Committee, accuses ~Ir. King of failing to report to the court
37
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the true facts with respect to certain false testimony,
the Hearing Committee actually determined that such
alleged conduct was unethical because it is claimed that
such action and conduct on the part of Mr. King violated
the provisions of Sub-Paragraphs 15 and 41 of Section
32, Article III, Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar
governing professional conduct and discipline. We respectfully submit that even though it may be concluded
that Mr. King did not report the facts to the court or
opposing counsel concerning the false testimony until
June 21, 1954, that such cation on the part of Mr. King
did not in any way violate either fo the foregoing provisions. Sub-Paragraph 15 of Section 32, Rule III provides as follows :
''Nothing operates more certainly to create or
to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a
class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence wh~h
belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than
does the false claim that it is the duty of the
lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed
in winning his client's cause as is often set up by
the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions.
"It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his rlient 's innocence
or in the justire of his cause.

''The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the rlient, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability,' to the end that
nothing lw taken or be withheld from him, save
h~T the ru}N; of law, legally applied. No fear of
jurlirinl disfa,·or or public unpopularity should
38
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restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefits of any an.d every remedy and defense that
is a;uthorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his la.wyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind
that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for amy client, violation
of law or any manner of fra;ud or chican.e. He must
obey his own conscience and not that of his
client." (Italics added.)
Sub-Paragraph 41 of Section 32, Rule III, provides
as follows:
"When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or
deception has been practiced, which has unjustly
imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client,
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage
thus ~tnjustly gained, he should promptly inform
the injured person or his counsel, so that they
may take appropriate steps." (Italics added.)
If the testimony of either Mr. King or Mr. Black
is to be given any weight (and we respectfully submit
that there is no evidence in the record to the contrary),
the portion of sub-paragraph 15 which appears in italics
was being closely followed by them in the matter before
the court. This is much more than can be said of opposing counsel who, although well aware of the false statements made on the witness stand by Mr. Schnitzer and
:\f r. Hutchinson, failed to disclose the information to the
court until the 18th of June so that in the meantime he
eould continue to monitor and overhear the conversations
39
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going on in Mr. Schnitzer's room. If Mr. Sherman had
been forthright with the court or with the witnesses who
were on the stand on June lOth, 1954, he would· have
immediately disclosed that he knew the minutes were not
prepared nor the waiver of notice of the meeting signed
until that morning. However, to have done so would have
destroyed the possibility of his continuing to use the wire
tapping system, and would have exposed him as an unscrupulous individual in the methods used in obtaining
information by such device. Mr. Sherman did not make
any disclosure to the court until at the final conclusion
of the evidence in his case and during the interim made
no reference in the record at all to the fact that the testimony given on the lOth was false. (R. 188) On the other
hand Mr. King and Mr. Black made preparations to bring
the matter to the attention of the court in such a way as
to minimize the derrogatory affect it would have upon
their client's cause, realizing at the same time, that in
doing so they were acknowledging the commission of a
crime by Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson which could
not be expunged from the rec.ord by recanting. See
United States l'. Norri.s, 300 U.S. 564, 81 L. Ed. 808, 57
Sup. Ct. 535 where the court stated:
''The respondent admitted he gave intentionally false testimony on September 22d. His recantation on the following day cannot alter this
fad."
We submit that the provisions of Sub-paragraph 15
apply far more to the eonduct of 1\ir. Sherman than to
nn~· alleged misconduct on the part of 1\Ir. King.
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Implicit in the italicized portion of sub-paragraph
41 is the proposition that the client has, by reason of
fraud or deception, obtained an advantage from the
court. It is this advantage unjustly gained by the client
which the attorney must forego and obtain permission
of his client to forego or withdraw from the case. In the
instant matter the evidence is undisputed that no unfair
advantage or any advantage at all was gained by the
false testimony. Everyone appears to be in agreement
that the court was very dissatisfied with the evasive way
Mr. Schnitzer attempted to answer Mr. Sherman's questions on the morning of the lOth, so that the advantage,
if any, was with the opposing party rather than with Mr.
Schnitzer. Too, the decision of the trial court in that
case indicates that it was influenced by the nature of the
false testimony and the conduct of Mr. Schnitzer on the
witness stand since the judgment which it rendered was
later reversed by this Court. In reversing the judgment
this court stated:
"We have a great deal of sympathy for the
trial court which was required to wade through
a morass of claimed embezzlement and perjury,
accusations and counter-accusations as well as
recriminations between opposing counsel, but we
cannot allow even the self-confessed perjury of
the appellant Schnitzer to blind our eye to the
plain, unambiguous terms of the contract between
the parties." (5 Utah 2nd 244, 257, 300 P. 2d 610)
It is also significant that the confessed false testimony related to an immaterial matter, the actual preparation and signing of the minutes in question being immaterial to the issues in the case. See State v. Hutchinsn 11, 4 Utah 2d 404, 406, 295 P. 2d 345.
41
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In the case of In Re Watson, 83 Neb. 211, 119 N.W.
451, the accused attorney had dictated an affidavit in the
presence and hearing of the witness, but had the witness
sign a blank paper below where the information was to
be typed. After conferring with another attorney it was
decided that additional statements were needed in the
affidavit and after the witness had gone the additional
statements were added to those which the affiant had
previously disclosed. The affidavit further stated that
the statements were made before three witnesses, all of
which was not true. After the corrected affidavit was
typed up, the attorney instructed a notary in the office
to notarize and find the affiant and have him sign it at
the bottom again. However, the notary could not find
the affiant so the name apparently was erased in the
position where it had originally been signed and placed
at the end of the instrument. It was a forgery. Subsequently, the attorney who prepared the affidavit was
accused of an effort to deceive and practice a fraud upon
the court and of causing a false, forged and untruthful
affidavit to be made. Upon review of the facts the Supreme Court of ~ ehraska held that in the absence of
any attempt on the part of the attorney to take adYantage
of the affidavit the conduct would not warrant disciplinary action h~· disharrment or suspension. The court
rommented:
''Had he made an attempt to mislead or deceive the court c>Yen though unsuccessfully, it
would havc> been a different question.''
In the instant matter, ~r r. King did nothing to misIPnd the court. He did not have anything to do with the
42
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preparation of the minutes or of the waiver of notice
of meeting and the Hearing Committee has not found
that he had any connection therewith. Nor did he elicit
the false testimony before the court or at any time
attempt to take advantage of such false testimony or
attempt to influence the court therewith. In the case of
In Re Palmeri, 162 N.Y.S. 799, 176 App. Div. 58 (Order
reversed 117 N.E. 1078), the attorney, charged with unprofessional conduct, had previously defended one DeLane in a criminal case. DeLane was charged with
living from money given him out of the profits of certain
prostitutes. The District Attorney had a complaining
witness, a prostitute, whom he allowed to live in a certain
flat, rather than in custody, during the time awaiting
trial. One day she disappeared and the police were unsuccessful in finding her. The State's case was greatly
weakened because of her absence. During the middle of
the Defendant's case, she appeared in the courtroom with
a suitcase in hand, and testified, upon being called as a
defense witness, that she read about the case in a newspaper out of town and just arrived in town. As a matter
of fact she had not left town and had been in constant
touch with the Defendant's attorney who had staged her
spectacular appearance. She testified falsely as to other
matters also, which the attorney for Defendant knew
were false. He relied upon these false statements in summing up to the jury, and made no effort to correct them.
The. lower court, in finding the attorney guilty of
unprofessional conduct stated:
"We cannot think that an attorney conforms
to professional standards where he permits a
43
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witness procured by him, and regarded by him as
highly important, to state a play by suddenly
appearing in the courtroom with a suitcase in her
hand, and by permitting her to testify that she
had just arrived on an early morning train, that
no one knew of her coming, and that her attention
had been called to the trial by an evening paper
in an up-state town the night before, when he
knew that she had been sent for by his client, had
been at his home in consultation with him in a
distant part of the city each day of the trial, and,
to his knowledge, was deliberately and knowingly
testifying falsely. His failure to say to her on
her first statement that she had just reached town
that morning: 'Why, are you not mistaken? Did
you not come to see me yesterday f' is susceptible
to the interference that he knew exactly what she
was going to testify to ; and his second question
as to what she had in her hand when she entered
the courtroom was to draw attention to the suitcase and add veisimilitude to her narrative. If
there be any grounds for not holding respondent
to a strict accountability for her false testimony,
there certainly is no excuse for his adopting such
false testimony, in his own summing up, for
which he was alone responsible . . . He is therefore debarred."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (117 N.E. 1078)
the decision of the lower court was reversed by a memorandum which held that the ''evidence does not warranty
the conclusion that there was intentional misconduct on
the part of the appellant, justifying his disbarrment upon
thP charge sustained by the Appellate decision." This
dPeision in effect approved the dissenting opinion rendPl'Pd in tlw lowPr court wherein Justice Page stated
that the evidence wa~ insufficient that the attorney
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"coached or instructed the witness to testify as she did";
and since the witness gave the false testimony voluntarily and not in response to any questions of the attorney, the attorney was not responsible and not guilty of
misconduct.
Another case which we feel is significant and pursuasive in this matter is the case of In Re Smith, 365 Ill.
11, 5 N.E. 2d 227. There the complaint charged that
Smith, an attorney, while representing a colored defendant, caused the defendant to change clothes with his
brother and the brother to blacken his face with burned
cork. It was discovered by the State's attorney and the
Court instructed the men to change clothes and for defendant to appear as he did when brought to the courthouse on the morning of the trial. The attorney said
he only wanted the defendant to appear just as he was
on the night of the alleged crime, and thus had the two
people change clothes and add black to their faces. The
trial court indicated it did not believe that the attorney
was attempting to impose on the court. However, the
state's attorney thought it was an attempt to confuse
his witnesses on their identification. The Supreme Court
of Illinois held:
''Each case of this character must be considered on its own merits, as no hard and fast rule
can be laid down to govern them all. To justify
disbarrment, proof of carelessness or mistaken
judgment is not sufficient. Misconduct complained
of must be shown by clear and convincing testimony to have been fraudulent and the result of
dishonest and improper motives. The proof must
not only show acts of misconduct, but must clearly
45
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show they were intended to defraud or deceive.
The burden of proof where fraud is charged is
upon the party bringing the charge, as all men
are presumed to act from honest motives wntil
the contrary is shown. Charges of misconduct, to
form the basis for disbarrment or suspension of
an attorney, must be proved by clear and convincing testimony. The record must disclose a case
that is free from doubt, not alone as to the act
done, but also as to the fraudulent motive with
which it is done ... The mere failure of an attorney to exercise good judgment in a transaction
with his client, due to his inexperience, where no
motive or intent to cheat or defraud is shown,
does not disclose any fraudulent intent or dishonest motive on the part of respondent, we do
not believe it justifies his disbarrment or suspension from the practice of law." (Italics added.)
The italicized portion above clearly demonstrates
that the motive of the attorney must be established as
being dishonest and improper, not only by suspicion or
by a preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and
convincing evidence. We submit in this case that the
evidence does not so establish and that the ac-eused Mr.
King did not have any dishonest or improper motives
in remaining silent when the witnesses testified falsely
upon examination by opposing counsel.
III.
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW.

As hereinbefore stated, both the facts as well as the
authorities cited in thi~ brief support the proposition
46
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that the accused Mr. King acted reasonably under all
the facts and circumstances; and the evidence fails to
disclose by clear and convincing proof that he is guilty
of any misconduct. The most that can be said is that by
reason of the innuendos and statements of Mr. Sherman
and Mr. Terry there are suspicious circumstances but
when these circumstances are considered in the light of
all of the testimony in the case any doubt as to the integrity and professional responsibility of Mr. King should
be dispelled.
This is not a csae, for instance, where the attorney
has been charged and convicted of withholding client's
money as was the case in In Re Barclay, 82 Utah 208, 24
P. 2d 302 where the court suspended the attorney for
three months for the misappropriation of his client's
funds. Rather, we refer the court to the case of In Re
Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217 where the court, thirteen years after the original accusation was filed against
the attorneys, exonerated them from any misconduct on
the basis of all of the facts and circumstances attendant
in the matter.
When this entire case is boiled down to the ''nub''
and all of the chaff and straw blown away, we have only
the claim and the finding that Mr. King did not promptly
and immediately notify the court with respect to his
knowledge concerning false statements made by his client
on examination by opposing counsel. We agree with the
statement made by 2\f r. Black on cross examination:

' ' A. I have been trying cases in the courts of
this state for a good number of years. I have been
47
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confronted on a good number of occasions, both
as counsel for and as counsel against parties who
in my judgment and in my opinion have testified
falsely. I have on every occasion when my own
client has done that, endeavored to the very best
of my ability to correct the record and to bring
out the truth in that case. But I have yet to see
one single counsel who in all my experience stood
forth immediately and without question, either
before the court or in the chamber of the court
and denounced the perjury in part, and I will say
this, if that is the proper thnig to do and the
appropriate thing for counsel to do, then we ought
to be educated to that fact and we ought to have
a clear cut determination of that fact. But I know
of no such determination that has ever been made
yet, and I know of no such counsel who has such
a shining armor of virtue that he has been doing
that in this community or in any other community." (R. 227)
If this Court desires to take a position and announce
to the public and the Bar generally that in situations of
this kind, where counsel for either side is aware of false
testimony being given in the case, he should immediately,
forthrightly and unequivocally announce to the Court
his knowledge concerning the matter, every member of
the Bar of this state should be apprised of his responsibilit~'· Mr. King should not be pilloried because of the
areusations of an unscrupulous attorney or made the
Pxample of a principle which has yet to be formulated
and defined by this Court.
SUMl\IARY
It is respectfully submitted that in view of all the
fad~ and circumstanreR in this case, the charges against
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Mr. King should be dismissed and that the recommendation and proposed order of the Board of Bar Commissioners be rejected.
Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
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